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Law-Aware Access Control and its 
Information Model 
Michael Stieghahn and Thomas Engel 
Abstract—Cross-border access to a variety of data such as market information, strategic information, or customer-related 
information defines the daily business of many global companies, including financial institutions. These companies are obliged 
by law to keep a data processing legal for all offered services. They need to fulfill different security objectives specified by the 
legislation. Therefore, they control access to prevent unauthorized users from using data. Those security objectives, for 
example confidentiality or secrecy, are often defined in the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language that promotes 
interoperability between different systems. 
In this paper, we show the necessity of incorporating the requirements of legislation into access control. Based on the work flow 
in a banking scenario we describe a variety of available contextual information and their interrelations. Different from other 
access control systems our main focus is on law-compliant cross-border data access. By including legislation directly into 
access decisions, this lawfulness can be ensured. We also decribe our information model to demonstrate how these policies 
can be implemented into an existing network and how the components and contextual information interrelate. Finally, we outline 
an event flow for a request made from a remote user exemplifying how such a system decides about access.  
Index Terms—Access control, context-awareness, law-awareness, information model.  
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
LTHOUGH research on access control has been a 
topic of interest for years, the new field of Legal En-
gineering [5], in combination with access control, is 
of increasing importance. In times of an ongoing global 
financial crisis, an increasing demand for regulation of 
financial markets exists.  
Currently used remote desktop solutions, such as Citrix 
XenApp, VNC, or Microsoft RDP, provide the conveni-
ence of a known desktop environment for their users. 
Such solutions are necessary because traveling employees 
of global working companies need access to data stored 
on the servers of their company. However, such remote 
desktop solutions do not dynamically restrict access to 
information that is necessary to fulfill a certain task but 
give full access to data. Similarly, currently used access 
control systems (e.g. Access Control Lists (ACL) and 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)) lack the possibility of 
including legal constraints in their access decisions. Nev-
ertheless, deciding whether an access to specific data un-
der a given context is legal is an indispensable factor for 
many companies. 
 
We illustrate the necessity for a Law-Aware Access Con-
trol that incorporates legislation in an international bank-
ing application scenario using the following example, 
which is derived from results of interviews with bank 
consultants: 
A consultant travels by plane from one country to a cus-
tomer reside in another country. The legislation of the 
country where the company is situated comprises laws 
regarding bank secrecy and data protection. The custom-
ers' country has a law that concedes the right to privacy; 
however, it has a restriction of this privacy that allows the 
border security to check mobile devices regarding their 
content. Therefore, airport security potentially checks the 
mobile device1 and so, to avoid disclosure of confidential 
information, such data cannot be stored on the device. 
However, when meeting the customer, the consultant 
needs to access the data of the customer. Since bank 
secrecy and privacy can prohibit the use of a remote desk-
top solution in the customers' country, the necessary data 
has to be transferred in advance to the device after the 
consultant has left the airport. An active connection pos-
sibly reveals a link between a customer and a bank. This 
breaks bank secrecy. Thus, a remote desktop solution 
might be the right choice, if the consultant and the cus-
tomer could instead meet in a country different from both 
mentioned before, where the legal restrictions are not as 
strict as in the country of the customer. 
 
The legislation of a country applies to everyone located 
within the country. However, accessing data such as con-
fidential customer-related data or strategic information 
that is hosted in another country introduces the problem 
of being subject to at least two sets of legislation. The leg-
islation of different countries may vary in respect of, for 
example, bank secrecy, data security, data privacy, and 
the use of encryption. An access control system has, there-
 
1 As happened recently: 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/08/11/ripa_iii_figures/ 
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fore, to ensure a law-compliant access.  
 
Various approaches, which extend RBAC by different 
notions of context to overcome its limitations regarding 
dynamically changing situations, have been widely stu-
died.  
 
Bertino et al. [1] introduce temporal authorization in a 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) system to combine 
authorization together with start and an expiration time. 
This approach supports temporal constraints, as we know 
from the time defined by the task when the data access is 
required and from the legislation at which time the access 
is legal. In the case of a dynamic access, the temporal au-
thorization supports relaxation in terms of serviceability 
and Single-Sign-On (SSO). 
On the other hand, restriction of the maximum time dur-
ing which an access to the requested data is legal in terms 
of the legal situation. However, the time alone does not 
reveal whether the access is legal. 
 
Strembeck and Neumann [14] present an approach to 
enforce contextual constraints in a dynamic RBAC that 
checks the current values of contextual attributes for pre-
defined conditions. In their approach permissions can be 
associated with context constraints.  
 
Damiani et al. [2] define the spatially-aware access-
control model GEO-RBAC. It enhances RBAC with spa-
tial- and location-based information to model objects, us-
er positions, and roles that are activated based on the po-
sition of the user. In add a physical position, users are 
also assigned a logical and device-independent position. 
However, binding the activation to roles based on the 
location information of the user is not sufficient when 
cross-border data access to confidential data is necessary. 
Thus, the location information can be used to serve two 
purposes: first, the location information for the start point 
and the end point of a connection is used to select the 
observable set of legislation, and second, it can localize a 
data access to a specific location to fulfill law-compliance. 
 
Ungureanu and Minsky[15] and Serban et al. [11] de-
scribed a mechanism called Law-Governed Interaction 
(LGI) that regulates the activities of the participants in an 
e-commerce transaction. LGI allows participants, who are 
combined to an open group of distributed heterogeneous 
agents, to interact with each other with confidence that 
this interaction is policy-compliant. The policies are called 
the law of the open group. In contrast to our solution, the 
term ``location'' means that laws are defined globally but 
enforced locally. Therefore, location is restricted to a 
group, a membership in a group, and contracts between 
participants, such that laws exist that are only valid for 
certain groups and not globally for all participants. Our 
solution uses location in the sense of a real location (a 
specific country or city as well as the proximity of a spe-
cific user). We also do not need a means for binding laws 
to certain users but bind instead to a location itself, be-
cause laws are enforced on the basis of the location. 
 
The Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) [7] introduces 
Geospatial eXtensible Access Control Markup Language 
(GeoXACML) as an extension to XACML [6]. It supports 
policy declaration and enforcement based on geographi-
cal information. The language provides spatial attributes, 
which are derived from the Geographic Markup Lan-
guage (GML) [9], for example, a Point, for a single loca-
tion; a Polygon, for an area enclosed by a boundary; and a 
MultiPoint, for a set of single locations. It targets the ex-
change of access rights between different jurisdictions by 
providing a standard policy language to specify and en-
force access rights for geospatial data. The support of the 
declaration of spatial restrictions is the main difference 
from XACML. GeoXACML uses XACML extension me-
chanisms and provides a definition of geometry data 
types and possible encoding of these types. GEOXACML 
targets different scenarios from our application, for ex-
ample, two national entities that manage cross border 
events together and need to change the appearance of 
data in such a way that it complies with the national im-
plementation. Unlike GEOXACML, we do not target mu-
tual access to data by both engaged parties, but include 
the sets of legislation of the source and destination coun-
try of a connection into an access decision. 
 
1.1 Approach and Contribution  
This paper reports our ongoing research to develop a 
Law-Aware Access Control system. We extend the ap-
proach introduced in [12], where we used a logic-based 
implementation. In this paper, we demonstrate how the 
widely used eXtensible Access Control Markup Language 
(XACML) can be used to enhance an access control sys-
tem, for example Role-Based Access Control. Today, 
XACML is used to define policies that regulate access to 
different data by providing a standard for access permis-
sions as well as for policy request and responses to them. 
Our contribution is to use the eXtensible Access Control 
Markup Language to incorporate legislation into access 
decisions by enriching policies with legal constraints and 
then. These constraints are based on various types of con-
text and their interrelations. By including legislation di-
rectly into access decisions, lawfulness can be ensured. In 
this paper, we use an information model to demonstrate 
how these policies can be implemented into an existing 
network and how the components and contextual infor-
mation interrelate. 
To prevent overregulation, our approach guarantees that 
the access restrictions are only as strict as it is obliged by 
the legislation of the source and destination country. 
 
1.2 Organization of the Paper  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In 
Section 2, we briefly describe the eXtensible Access Con-
trol Markup Language.  In Section 3, we specify the dif-
ferent types of context information that are needed to in-
corporate legislation into access decisions and describe 
how an access decision is made. We state different possi-
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ble attacks against our approach and briefly discuss the 
difference between access decisions for an emergency 
scenario and for a banking scenario. In Section 4, we de-
scribe our information model to show how the compo-
nents of the existing network interrelate and describe an 
event flow from the moment a user is requesting access to 
a resource until the decision is sent back to the requester. 
Section 5 concludes the paper and outlines future work. 
 
2 THE EXTENSIBLE ACCESS CONTROL MARKUP 
LANGUAGE 
The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language is a 
declarative access control policy language designed to 
support authorization systems. 
XACML is implemented in XML to provides a processing 
model, describing how to interpret the policies and, as a 
second part, a request / response context language. A 
typical system using XACML consists of different com-
ponents (Fig. 1) such as the Policy Enforcement Point 
(PEP), a Policy Administration Point (PAP), a Context 
Handler, a Policy Information Point (PIP), and a Policy 
Decision Point (PDP). The PEP delegates decision-making 
and enforces access decisions. The PAP creates security 
policies and stores these policies in the repository of the 
PDP. The PDP receives and examines requests relayed 
from the PEP. It selects the applicable policies for an 
evaluation of each request and returns the authorization 
decisions to the PEP. The PIP serves the context handler 
as source of attribute values or other data that is required 
for a policy evaluation. The context handler itself is a re-
presentation of a decision request and an authorization 
decision. 
 
XACML policies are structured as a tree of sub-policies 
(Fig. 2). Each tree has a defined target and a set of leaves 
containing a set of rules. A target defines certain condi-
tions to determine whether or not this policy is applicable 
to a request. It is specified by four properties: a subject, a 
resource, an action, and an environment. Subject defines a 
user or process that requests access to a resource, which 
might be a file, a system, or a service. An operation on a 
resource is defined as action. The Environment defines a 
set of attributes, which are necessary to decide about 
access, but which are not related to a specific subject, an 
action, or an environment. Attributes are features of a 
subject, a resource, an action or an environment. Rules 
define how to process a target and consist of Boolean ex-
pressions, which are interpreted and executed by the 
PDP. Rules consist of a target, an effect, and conditions. 
The latter describe the state of the attributes of the target 
to satisfy the rule, whereas effect specifies how to proceed 
(e.g. permit or deny) if the conditions are satisfied.  
The response to the request is structured as follows: deci-
sion, status, and obligation. There are four possible deci-
sions: permit, deny, not applicable, or indeterminate. Not ap-
plicable is returned if no rules or applicable policies can be 
found. Indeterminate indicates that an error occurred dur-
ing the access decision. Obligations can be attached to the 
response and direct the PEP, for example, to process an 
access in a designated way. However, XACML does not 
specify the communication protocol between a PEP and a 
PDP. 
 
If more than one policy needs to be applied, a rule-
combining algorithm, specified in the policies, defines 
how to merge the different policies. The XACML specifi-
cation [6] defines four different combining algorithms to 
specify how policies of a policy set are combined during 
an access decision process: 
Deny-overrides: Returns deny if any evaluation returns 
deny. Otherwise, permit is returned. 
Permit-overrides: If any rule evaluates to permit, then 
the result is permit. If any rule returns deny and all other 
rules evaluate to not applicable the result is deny. If all 
rules evaluate to not applicable, the result remains as not 
applicable. 
First applicable: Returns the first result of a rule evalua-
tion that is different from not applicable. If all rules return 
not applicable, this response is returned. 
Only-one-applicable: If only one policy is applicable its 
result is returned. If more than one applies the result is 
indeterminate. If no rule is applicable, the result is not 
applicable. 
XACML also allows the implementation of user-defined 
combining algorithms.  
 
3 LAW-AWARE ACCESS 
Remote access within a country, but especially cross-
border access, implies that at least one set of legislation 
needs to be observed. In particular, financial institutions 
need to ensure both law-compliant access and security of 
data against attacks. In general, laws define, among other 
things, conditions to satisfy and describe the handling of 
data and data access. When requesting access to data, 
different types of context information can be used to sup-
port access decisions.  
 
 
Fig. 2. The XACML policy structure. 
 
Fig. 1. Data flow in the standart XACML model. 
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A general business environment and an international fi-
nancial environment provide various types of context 
information. Consultants fix appointments with col-
leagues, customers, or suppliers at a certain time and lo-
cation. They have a specific work flow and work on spe-
cific documents. A variety of context information can in-
form access decisions in such environments. 
 
Extending the definition for context categories of Dey et 
al. [3] with the additional categories legal constraints and 
second identity [12] better fits the needs of an access control 
system that must dynamically respect different sets of 
legislation.  
 
The context model is described as: Who does What for 
Whom, When, Where restricted by Which legislation.  
To achieve Law-Aware Access Control, we include vari-
ous aspects of context information. Law-Aware Access 
Control uses identity, task, time, location and legal con-
straints as the main concepts in context information. 
These main concepts can contain a variety of subconcepts, 
which describe particular context information in more 
detail, e.g. time point and time range are two different 
possibilities for the context time.  
This combination of context information is used to gener-
ate authorizations for a specific subject, an object and an 
action with respect to the legislation of the source and 
destination countries.  
When an access control system decides about access, the 
current context situation (e.g. the identity of users and 
their locations) has a large impact on the authorization, 
which is not the case for a standard access control system.  
 
Only iff the current context situation complies with the 
legislation in force and to the other constraints imposed 
by the access control system in an authorization given 
and the system grants access to the requested data. 
 
3.1 Context Identity: The Who and The Whom 
Identities (determined by who and whom in the context 
definition) are used in two ways: One identity identifies 
the user, a member of the set of users, e.g. all consultants 
of a company. The other identity defines the customer 
who is the subject of the data. 
 
In general, following the approach of the most access con-
trol systems the identity of a user defines the access to 
data. This is necessary, but not sufficient for mobile access 
in a banking environment, because a user can access more 
data than necessary to fulfill a specific task.  To limit 
access to necessary data that corresponds to both identi-
ties reduces the risk of unintentional disclosure of confi-
dential data of further customers. Usually, it is likely that 
a consultant advises just one customer at the same time (a 
capability-based temporal constraint). That means a one-
to-one relationship during a specific time period. Hence, 
the consultant needs only access to the data of the specific 
customer. If the consultant wants to access customer-
related data, the identity of the customer, the person 
whose information is stored in the data, is used to check 
the accessibility of the requested data. The identity of a 
customer can be verified either by the knowledge of the 
customer, a property a customer owns (e.g. a code card, 
for which a subset of its content is requested by the access 
control system, an RSA token, or an application that is 
installed on the customer's cellular phone such that the 
customer can enter an identifying code on his own mobile 
device), or a combination of any of these. If consultants 
meet a third party financial supplier, the one-to-one rela-
tionship (1:1) may also hold with respect to the supplier. 
However, the consultants also may need access data per-
taining to more than one of their customers, for example 
to plan the customers' investments. This extends, the rela-
tionship to a one-to-one-to-n relationship (1:1:n), whereas 
the consultant acts as relay. Therefore, a consultant needs 
one or more explicit delegations for such a task. 
 
In a meeting it is important that people meet at a specific 
place at the same time, e.g. in a counseling interview 
where a consultant meets a customer.  The presence of the 
customer distinguishes a customer service from prepara-
tion, and can be used for example to switch between dif-
ferent data views, either data with real customers names 
or pseudonymous data. 
 
3.2 Context Task: The What 
A task describes what occurs in a specific situation, for 
example a customer service or a meeting with a third par-
ty contractor. In our scenario, the context task is a manda-
tory justification for mobile data access to sensitive data. 
Nevertheless, a task is not necessarily required to access 
data that is not customer-related or confidential, such as 
product information or strategic information. In our defi-
nition, the task is determined by an entry in the diary of a 
user that also links to other context information such as 
particular identities, the data that is likely to be necessary 
for the task, and the the location and time at which the 
meeting will take place. 
 
3.3 Context Time: The When 
The context time represents a common access control con-
straint [1]. When a user requests access to specific infor-
mation, the access control system checks whether the user 
is allowed to access this data at the current point in time.  
The context time is defined for customer-related data by a 
task, e.g. an appointment with a customer.  For access to 
non-customer-related data, the time range can be defined, 
for example, by a policy of the company to cover the des-
ignated working hours of a consultant (Policy 1). Due to 
the different time zones on a trip, the location context is 
used to calculate the correct local time. Sensitive data 
should be accessible for a limited time only to proactively 
minimize the risk of unauthorized access or data disclo-
sure. 
 
In our definition, the context time is either a single time 
point or a time range. For our context time authorization 
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we partly follow the definition of temporal authorizations 
of Bertino et al. [1]. A TimeRange is defined by a closed 
interval of a start time point and an end time point. A 
nearly positive access authorization is a special concession, to 
concede certain flexibility to the consultant, where an au-
thorization gives access to specific data in an anonymous 
or pseudonymous way. Such an interval can start at a 
defined time point before and can end at a defined time 
point after the actual activity depending on the legal con-
straints (see the following section). That means that all 
links to a specific customer within a file are removed, al-
lowing a consultant to prepare for a meeting without be-
ing in the proximity of a customer.  
 
 
By default, the XACML policy language provides a tem-
poral authorization. Policy 1 is concrete implementation 
of the abstract example above. The policy orders the Poli-
cy Decision Point (PDP) to check the environmental 
attribute values for the time to determine whether or not 
the current point in time is within the allowed time be-
tween 8:00am and 6:00pm. If the current time is outside 
this interval the policy denies access, as the second last 
line of Policy 1 shows. 
 
3.4 Context Location: The Where 
 
Various approaches to context-aware access control sy-
tems [8,2] use the location as context information in deci-
sions concerning access. Location describes the physical 
position of a mobile device. Such a position specifies not a 
single location point, but a location space. The method of 
determination defines the precision and the size of such a 
location space. A position can be described by absolute 
values (GSM cell or GPS) or relative values (derived from 
an absolute position or from a proximity measurement). 
In our approach, we distinguish between a legislation loca-
tion and an activity location. The legislation location deter-
mines the validity area of a law - the country or region 
where specific laws must be be observed. For the activity 
location we differentiate between the expected location and 
the current location. An expected location is noted by the 
consultant in the diary and specifies a location from 
which the access request to data is expected, for example, 
at the meeting location with a customer. In our case, if a 
consultant has to travel abroad to accomplish a task, the 
supervisor gives an authorization for the travel in ad-
vance. This authorization uses a ``second set of eyes'' to 
confirm the expected location. The current location is 
where a consultant is actually located during an access.  
 
In this document we use the term zone as synonym for an 
activity location.  
 
We define a model called zone+ to categorize locations. 
Zone+ is an XML location tree where a node can for exam-
ple be a region (e.g. the European Union or the North 
American Free Trade Area), a country (e.g. Japan or Ger-
many) or a state (e.g. New York, Saxony-Anhalt). The two 
children of such a node contain the areas separated into 
restricted areas where special law enforcement exists (e.g. 
in a customs area or a police station) and an unrestricted 
area, which contains all areas that are not defined as re-
stricted. This bisection is used to support the insulation of 
sensitive data that should not be disclosed, for example, 
during a customs inspection where a consultant omitted 
to close the connection to a confidential resource at head-
quarters. The unrestricted area lacks particular attributes, 
which restricted areas hold. Such an attribute is, for ex-
ample, a higher probability to of being checked by the 
police or customs compared to that in a café in an arbi-
trary city. Pol.2. shows the augmented location informa-
tion sent from a location supplier of the XACML system. 
The location may consists of the GPS values that were 
sent from the mobile client together with some additional 
information assigned to it, for example, the country, the 
city and the zone+ value ``unrestricted'', which states that 
the point in question is located in a unrestricted area (e.g. 
not in London City Airport). 
 
The definition of XACML itself provides no means of de-
fining a legislative location. Thus, within the definition of 
the target an additional attribute extends the policy with 
an identifier that specifies the area where the policy is 
applicable. As the subject, resource, and action are 
checked, this attribute is included in the decision as to 
whether this policy is applicable to the current request or 
not. Therefore, if an access to data in country A is re-
quested from another country B, both countries are 
<Policy PolicyId="WorkingTimePolicy" RuleCombiningAlgId="  
    rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
  <Target>... </Target> 
  <Rule RuleId="LoginRule" Effect="Permit"> 
    <Target> ... </Target> 
    <Condition FunctionId="function:and"> 
      <Apply FunctionId="function:time-greater-than-or-equal"> 
        <Apply FunctionId="function:time-one-and-only"> 
          <EnvironmentAttributeSelector DataType="XMLSchema#time" 
                                      AttributeId="environment:current-time"/> 
        </Apply> 
        <AttributeValue DataType="XMLSchema#time"> 
          08:00:00 
        </AttributeValue></Apply> 
      <Apply FunctionId="function:time-less-than-or-equal"> 
        <Apply FunctionId="function:time-one-and-only"> 
          <EnvironmentAttributeSelector DataType="XMLSchema#time"  
             AttributeId="environment:current-time"/> 
        </Apply> 
        <AttributeValue DataType="XMLSchema#time"> 
          18:00:00 
        </AttributeValue> 
      </Apply> 
    </Condition> 
  </Rule> 
  <Rule RuleId="FinalRule" Effect="Deny"/> 
</Policy> 
 
Pol. 1. Extract of a time-based login policy. 
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checked. If the location defined in the policy equals either 
country A or B the policy becomes applicable unless sub-
ject, resource, and action do not match the request. A leg-
islation tag in a subsequent policy definition can affiliate 
different countries provided that the countries concerned 
are listed as AttributeValues of a LocationMatch. 
 
Note that, in the standard XACML model, the legislation 
tag will be ignored. Therefore, the decision as to whether 
a policy applies to a request is based on subject, resource, 
and action only. A system, which does not evaluate the 
legislation tag, is over-restrictive rather than under-
restrictive, because legislation-driven policies of different 
countries tend to constrain access. We also must point 
out, that instead of using the additional legislation tag to 
define a legislation location, the property environment 
can be used.  In our opinion, proceeding with our ap-
proach is more unambiguous than merging the legislation 
location into an existing tag. However, this might be a 
subject for further discussion as the development of the 
XACML standard continues.  
 
The proximity of a customer can additionally be used as a 
criterion for access control. Since the proximity to a cus-
tomer provides a logical position of the user, but not the 
current physical position, the proximity criterion can only 
support a location-based decision. The fact that a custom-
er is close to the consultant does not guarantee that the 
current location matches with the expected location.  
However, the proximity of a customer adds a certain de-
gree of security, for example, if the legislation requires 
that specific data is only accessible while the customer is 
present. It is not a unique characteristic that can super-
sede, for example, a GPS derived location. 
 
Location information has a tremendous impact on usabili-
ty. The precision of location is very important if the access 
is to allowed in certain areas, e.g. in a lounge of an air-
port, but not in the check-in area. In particular in a bank-
ing scenario, missing location information can lead to the 
complete lock-up of a system that follows our approach. 
To prevent this, when the location cannot be determined 
with the necessary precision, such a system can allow the 
access to customer-related data that uses a pseudonym 
for the customer or that is completely anonymous, iff the 
other types of context information match the expected 
values. 
 
Location as context information is tied up with the prob-
lem of the observation of employees, which is a very sen-
sitive topic and also the subject of legislation in some ju-
risdiction. Therefore, a system that implements our ap-
proach should request information only at the moment of 
the mobile data access and not constantly track the 
movement of a user. As a consequence, the problem of 
continuous observation of a user does not arise. 
 
By relying on different types of context information we 
can prevent that an attacker who is in possession of a sin-
gle context information (e.g. the location information) 
from successfully attacking a system. 
 
3.5 Context Legal Constraints: Is it legal or not? 
 
In the previous section we distinguished between legisla-
tion location and activity location. The first, the legislation 
location, defines the validity area of legislation.  
It is a territory where a specific set of laws, which were 
written by the responsible authority, must be observed by 
legal entities situated within its bounds. A legislation lo-
cation can be a union (e.g European Union), a sovereign 
state (e.g. Japan, Germany, or Luxembourg), a state (e.g. 
Florida, California, or British Columbia), or an organiza-
tion (e.g. Microsoft Corporation, Allianz SE), whereas the 
last addresses organizational policies. 
The second, the activity location, as synonym for the cur-
rent position of the user requesting the data, determines 
the set of legislation that have to be observed.  
 
Depending on the controlling authority, laws can over-
rule other laws, for example federal law overrules state 
law, the national legislation of a European Union country 
is overrules European regulations. 
 
A law itself is defined by acts. An act consists of articles, 
which can consist of sections, paragraphs, and clauses.  
Sections cover different aspects on an atomic level, for 
example, how personal information should be handled.  
To simplify matters we maintain this hierarchy in this 
work but call all  ``law''. 
 
In general, laws are written in an unprecise language. 
However, the laws use a domain-specific terminology. 
Therefore, the concrete formalization from the informal 
description of law into legal terminology is a big chal-
lenge, which is described in more detail in [13]. 
 
By definition, a single law can influence one or more of 
the other context information items, for example, if a law 
<location> 
  <country>United Kingdom</country> 
  <city>London</city> 
  <zone> 
     <value>unrestricted</value> 
  </zone> 
  <timezone> 
    <name>GMT</name> 
    <value>0</value> 
  </timezone> 
  <position> 
    <gml:Point srsDimension="2" srsName="urn:ogc:def:crs:
EPSG:6.6:4326"> 
        <gml:pos>51.507861 -0.099349</gml:pos> 
    </gml:Point> 
  </position> 
</location> 
 
Pol. 2. Values of the zone+ location supplier. 
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prohibits trade on a specific date in one country, but that 
is a usual working day in another country, then a condi-
tion (Policy 1) has to reflect this law. Additionally, laws 
can cause conditional constraints that relate to context in-
formation, but cannot be represented by one of the con-
texts of the context model. Such a conditional constraint 
could be a signed customer agreement. Laws cannot al-
ways be specified by a single item of context information 
but may require as a set of such conditions. 
 
4 MODELING A LAW-AWARE ACCESS CONTROL 
SYSTEM 
Unlike other existing access control systems, Law-Aware 
Access Control system incorporates different sets of legis-
lation into its access decisions. Multinational companies, 
and in particular financial institutions, that provide cross-
border services performed by their consultants need to 
implement systems that automatically decide about 
access while keeping this access law-compliant. Incorpo-
rating different sets of legislation may easily lead to an 
over-restrictive system that prevents any access and, 
therefore, any service. In the following we describe a typ-
ical usage scenario for the Private Wealth Management 
department of a bank. 
 
We start by describing the work of a consultant at the 
head office. Customer service on location presents the 
most common work flow. One possibility is that a consul-
tant meets the customer in a consultation room with prin-
touts, pens and a note pad. The room has no computer2 
because of its assumed distraction, which results in a lack 
of attention to the customer. The consultant requests any 
missing timely information by phone. Hence, time is allo-
cated to brief a colleague beforehand and to receive this 
information during a meeting. Typical information con-
cerns, for example, the financial position of the customer, 
statistics, and information about the market. Additional-
ly, post-processing following customer service takes time. 
Although the consultant is at the workplace, time is 
needed to note the results and perform all actions. An 
alternative customer contact solution accesses files and 
information online. Since the information flow remains 
within the intranet, the current access control solutions 
might be sufficient, although the maintenance of the 
access control polices, which directly or indirectly derive 
from legislation, can be prolonged and difficult because 
of the problems associated with generating access control 
rules from legislation. 
 
In a second scenario, the consultant meets the customer 
abroad. This includes cross-border data access or cross-
border data transfer. When consultants visit their custom-
ers in different countries they need to have access to dif-
ferent types of information, which may have different 
level of confidentiality. Using a paper-based folder is nei-
ther secure, lightweight nor up-to-date. As consultants 
 
2 Situation of November 2007 
have described in interviews, information about client 
accounts is anonymized. This is done by cutting or black-
ing out sensible information. The information on the pa-
per is in cleartext and can only be safely stored in an at-
taché case. Despite anonymization, it is possible to make a 
correlation between the diary and the documents if they 
are stolen. As such a solution implies also a need for 
complete data, because a consultant cannot receive data 
quickly and securely when out of the office, the complete 
information for a customer could be disclosed. This 
presents a worst-case scenario.  
 
An online customer service is an alternative to the paper-
based approach. A consultant uses a mobile device that 
deploys a combination of a Virtual Private Network 
(VPN), a virtual machine, and a remote desktop solution, 
such as Microsoft Terminal, VNC or a Citrix Presentation 
Server. The host operating system simply provides a plat-
form for a virtual machine. Such a virtual machine hosted 
by, for example Sun's Virtualbox or VMware Inc.'s VM-
ware, provides a complete operating system that runs as 
an application on a host computer. Before starting the 
virtual machine a program can check the integrity of the 
image that contains the operating system. Thus, if an im-
age has been altered by an attacker a check of its check-
sum can prevent the virtual machine from starting. Con-
sequently, the image remains at it was set-up by adminis-
trator following the security officer's specification. After 
starting the virtual machine, the operating system is 
known to be clean of any malware because it has not been 
altered. Since it connects only to the intranet of the com-
pany via a VPN, all traffic to and from the device can be 
monitored. After connecting to the company, the consul-
tant can use a remote desktop solution that provides a 
familiar work environment. Although remote desktop 
solutions in current use do not dynamically restrict access 
based on the current context, they are widely used be-
cause the combination of virtualization and secure con-
nection is considered secure. Up to now, it is rather not so 
much complicated as impossible to prove either that the 
computer that is used as host computer to start the virtual 
machine is a real computer and not itself virtualized, or 
that the hypervisor is not hacked to provide a backdoor 
or distribute malicious code. A malicious hypervisor may 
support a stealth virtualization that allows the legitimate 
hypervisor to run in a virtual machine instead of serving 
as an interface between a virtual machine and the hard-
ware itself. Using such a malicious hypervisor, which is 
able to examine and potentially to change traffic between 
the legitimate hypervisor and the host computer, breaks 
the security barrier. Therefore, a restriction of data that is 
accessible is required. 
4.1 Modeling Context for a Law-Aware Access 
Control System 
An information model represents concepts, their proper-
ties and attributes, and their relationships. As an abstract 
model, the information model does not determine specific 
aspects of an implementation, for example, a specific pro-
tocol or platform (Fig.3.). 
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Legislation plays a major role in our approach. The com-
pany is governed by legislation that depends on the con-
text location (Geolocation) (at a minimum the legislation 
in force where the head office is located and the data is 
stored). The location defines the governing legislation, 
whereas the governing legislation itself defines the area 
where this legislation needs to be observed. The country 
where the company has its offices defines the legislation 
that governs the company as well as all its actions and 
employees. If the company has a branch office in another 
country, the local legislation of that country influences the 
company as well. The legislation also governs the service 
the company offers through the Internet, for example to 
provide remote access to its employees or online banking 
to its customers, because all actions and data transfer are 
subject to the law. If a user who accesses the service is 
located within the same country as the server, only the 
legislation of the current country needs to be observed.  
Otherwise, the service needs also to comply with a second 
set of legislation: the legislation where the access is in-
itiated. To be able to decide about legal access, legal text 
of legislation needs to be transformed to generate policies, 
which are stored as sets of policies for the reference moni-
tor (Fig.3.). A user employed by the company, in most 
cases a security officer, administrates the sets of policies 
by using a Policy Administration Point (PAP). This PAP 
manages the security policies, including those that have 
its source directly from a law transformation.  
 
A company employs one or more users and may offer a 
remote access to traveling employees or a web service for 
its users, customers, or the world at large. The types of 
context information in this model include: user, time, task, 
customer, and location. 
 
The diary is a concept that employees use to schedule and 
manage their working time and their tasks. In our model 
we presume that each user administers at least one diary. 
Additionally, users can administer, e.g., a team diary. 
During a working day a user performs a set of tasks. 
Some of these tasks may be noted in the diary, e.g., if they 
are related to a meeting, and some of them not, if they 
relate to daily business of the employee. A user has al-
ways a location, which might not be known to a server at 
all times. If a user connects to a server this information is 
important, especially, if the user does not connect from 
the office but remote from elsewhere. Just like the com-
pany, users are subject to the legislation of the country 
where they are currently located.  
 
Users, for example consultants, may be linked to one or 
 
Fig. 3. An information model of a Law-Aware Access Control. 
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more customers that they are in charge of. Other positions 
within the company may not be themselves linked to cus-
tomers but could support consultants for their customer 
service. Customers are linked to at least one responsible 
person who works for the company. 
When users fix an appointment, they note the following 
in their diary: a task, the time when the task is to take 
place, the location for which the task is planned, and, if 
necessary, the identities of the people who are going to 
attend the meeting. For example, in a banking scenario, a 
consultant notes the name of a customer to indicate that 
they will carry out a specific task related to the customer, 
for example a customer service. During a task, a consul-
tant may need to request access to data, which may con-
tain customer-related information that a customer sup-
plied during a prior meeting. 
 
In general, users need to authenticate themselves if they 
want to use a restricted system or a restricted service that 
the company provides. Other than services that are open 
to public, such as a company's website providing general 
information on its products or services, the company se-
cures its restricted systems against unauthorized use. Af-
ter obtaining suitable credentials, users may access the 
system. Those credentials can also secure mobile devices, 
such that only authorized personnel can use the devices. 
Secured devices allow users access the web service the 
company provides. 
 
Every request to a resource - either remotely to a web 
service or to a local server - involves the access control 
system (Fig.3). In the case where users request access to a 
resource, for example to a file or to a printer, the reference 
monitor checks their permission. On receiving a request 
from a user, the reference monitor evaluates the request 
by checking whether the resource exists and whether the 
requesting user possesses the permission for the re-
quested operation on the requested resource. The refer-
ence monitor also selects policies, stored using the Policy 
Administration Point, to evaluate the user's request for 
compliance. The resource in question may contain a varie-
ty of information that customers have provided or which 
is related to them and may differ in its level of confiden-
tiality depending on the content. As a result, the reference 
monitor can decide whether or not the user has permis-
sion to perform the specified operation on the resource. 
 
An audit checks, for example, whether the web-service 
and the access control system perform to specification 
and comply with the security requirements specified by 
the security officer.  
 
4.2 Event Flow 
The consultant may request access to data from any loca-
tion, for example, a hotel room the location where the 
meeting takes place. 
 
To do this, consultants use their mobile devices to connect 
to the web interface (e.g. an external Policy Enforcement 
Point), which is located in the demilitarized zone. A valid 
incoming request may consist of specifications of the sub-
ject, resource, action, and environment. Our system re-
quires the current location of the user to decide about the 
legality of the data access. The location information is 
either directly added to the request by the application or 
established afterwards by querying the mobile device. 
The current location may be determined from GPS data or 
GSM cell information. The external web interface for-
wards the request to the Reference Monitor  (internal Pol-
icy Enforcement Point (PEP)), after the user has been suc-
cessfully authenticated.  
 
The internal PEP redirects the incoming request to the 
Policy Decision Point (PDP). It also does this when if a 
device connects from the internal network and not via the 
web interface. The PDP translates the incoming request 
into an XACML request if necessary. After receiving a 
request, the Policy Decision Point starts evaluating it. The 
user's credentials are checked to establish whether the 
requesting user is allowed to use the system. The user's 
identifier and the identifier of the device are requested 
using local LDAP service or a database, depending on 
where this information is stored. The PDP may also need 
to retrieve required attributes concerning subject, re-
source, action, and environment of the request. If the user 
requests access to customer-related files, the Policy Deci-
sion Point checks the exchange server to see whether an 
appointment with the particular customer was scheduled 
at the current point in time. Additionally, the PDP may 
check whether the requested data is available. Finally, to 
be able to decide about the request, the PDP requests the 
applicable policies for the subject, resource, action, and en-
vironment. Besides the standard attributes, the PDP also 
needs to request the sets of legislation policies that are ap-
plicable for the countries of the source and the destination 
of the connection. After receiving all policies the Policy 
Decision Point makes the decision and sends the response 
back to the internal PEP. 
 
If the decision is to grant an access and an obligation was 
defined, the obligation service of the PEP will execute the 
obligations before forwarding the decision to the request-
er. The requester then may access the resource or, if the 
access has been denied, be informed of the reason for the 
denial. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we showed the necessity of incorporating 
legislation into access control systems. Cross-border data 
access introduces the problem that an access control sys-
tem must include two sets of legislation. The set of appli-
cable legislation-driven policies can, however, change 
between two access requests, when a consultant travels. 
In general, companies are obliged by law to keep a data 
processing legal for all offered services.  
 
Based on a consultant’s work flow for a customer service 
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in a financial institution, we identified a variety of availa-
ble context information that can be used in a Law-Aware 
Access Control system. Such system uses identity, task, 
time, location and legal constraints as the main concepts in 
context information, which can contain a variety of sub-
concepts. In particular legal constraints distinguishes our 
approach from existing access control systems as our 
main focus is on the law-compliance of data access.  
 
Finally, we showed an abstract information model to 
demonstrate how the identified context information and 
the components of an access control system interrelate. 
We briefly described an event flow in such a Law-Aware 
Access Control system outlining the access decision 
process starting from the user’s request until the access 
decision is sent back. 
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